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Abstract
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Chapter 11
Annuity Valuation, Long-Term Care,
and Bequest Motives
John Ameriks, Andrew Caplin, Steven Laufer,
and Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh

This chapter develops a formal framework for understanding how existing financial instruments impact retirement security and considers new
instruments that might be devised to enhance such security. Our framework
draws on a model developed by Ameriks et al. (2007) which allows for both
bequest and precautionary motives. Bequest objectives have to do with the
desire to leave some assets to one’s heirs. Precautionary motives include the
desire to avoid being simultaneously bankrupt and in need of long-term
care (LTC)—which here we term ‘Medicaid aversion.’ The model is used
to characterize how households might value stand-alone life-contingent life
annuities, where their valuation is seen to depend on household characteristics, including bequest motives and Medicaid aversion. Because such
standard life-contingent immediate annuities are shown to be of limited
value for most middle-class households, we then discuss alternative ‘contingent’ annuity designs that involve delayed payouts to better target longevity
risk, and/or contain elements of long-term care insurance by including
higher payments for those who are losing the ability to conduct one or
more ‘activities of daily living.’1 Our findings have implications for the
design of new financial instruments that permit family concerns to impact
bequest and precautionary motives.

Lifetime Annuities and Precautionary Motives
Economists have shown that life-cycle consumers with uncertain lifetimes
have strong incentives to annuitize wealth so as to be assured that resources
will support an adequate level of lifetime consumption.2 In practice, the
voluntary usage of immediate annuity products in the USA is low. For
instance, sales of standard annuities involving fixed payments in 2006
amounted to less than $6 billion of the estimated $236 billion in deferred
and immediate annuity sales in 2006 [Life Insurance Marketing Research
Association (LIMRA 2006)]. The picture changes little even if one includes
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immediate ‘variable’ life annuities that capture all or part of the equity
premium, whose importance is stressed by Milevsky and Young (2007), but
for which sales remain low outside the TIAA-CREF retirement system.
A large literature explores reasons for lack of consumer interest in
standard fixed immediate annuities. Friedman and Warshawsky (1988,
1990); Mitchell et al. (1999); and Brown et al. (2001) examine pricing of
immediate annuity contracts in the USA relative to hypothetical zero-cost
‘actuarially fair’ annuity contracts. They document persistent and significant costs of private annuity contracts above such a zero-cost benchmark,
as well as significant cross-sectional variation in pricing across insurance
providers. Yet their work suggests that insurance loads observed in practice (markups of roughly 7–15 percent relative to the benchmark zerocost annuity, assuming annuitant mortality) would still result in substantial
annuity demand among older individuals in the context of a basic lifecycle model. These findings are moderated by institutional constraints.
For instance, the generosity of Social Security benefits is mentioned by
Dushi and Webb (2004) as the major reason why voluntary annuitization rates are so low. Another institution important in this regard is
the family: Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) estimate that informal risk pooling of longevity/mortality risk within families can provide half or more
of the insurance benefit obtainable in a world with complete annuity
markets.
A more fundamental question concerning annuities is whether they
address the most important risks retirees believe they face. Research on
retiree spending suggests they may not, since many older households with
high retirement assets tend to spend down very slowly in practice (De
Nardi, French, and Jones 2006). In other words, such households are
relatively immune to longevity risk in the standard sense, because their
resources are virtually certain to last long enough to finance normal consumption expenditures in old age. One group of analysts, beginning with
Kotlikoff and Summers (1981), contends that households spend little in
retirement because of bequest motives; more recently Abel (2003) also
suggested that bequest motives may help to explain low demand for annuities. Yet Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond (2005) point out that this depends
critically on the form of the bequest motive, and in particular how risk
averse the retiree is with respect to bequests. Moreover, empirical studies
offer no clear evidence of an offset between annuitization and bequest
motives; for instance Brown (2001) uses the 1992 HRS and finds no significant relationship between peoples’ stated desire to leave bequests and
their stated intention to annuitize a DC plan upon retirement. Johnson,
Burman, and Kobes (2004) use the 2000 HRS where they determine that
older adults with no children are no more likely to annuitize DC balances
than others with children (and presumably stronger bequest motives).
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Laitner and Juster (1996) also uncover no significant difference in bequest
motives among households with and without children, though they do find
a relationship between stated desires to leave an estate and the selection of
certain immediate annuity refund features.
An alternative reason that people may not annuitize is that they may
prefer to keep their assets liquid for precautionary purposes, in case they
need the money for health expenses (Hurd 1987; Palumbo 1999). To this
we turn next.

How Health Expenses and Medicaid
Aversion Matter
To further explain how health costs and health preferences influence the
demand for annuities, we build on recent studies including French and
Jones (2004) and De Nardi, French, and Jones (2006). The issue of how
health might influence interest in annuities is unclear; as Davidoff, Brown,
and Diamond (2005) note, the demand for annuities will depend critically
on the timing of health shocks and ‘the illiquidity of annuities may be
relevant if the risk occurs early in life, but not toward the end of life.’
Turra and Mitchell (2008), however, show that relative to the high value
of annuities typically found in a basic life-cycle framework, annuities are
significantly less valuable for households facing uncertain age- and healthrelated medical care shocks. Sinclair and Smetters (2004) simulate a rich
model of medical costs in later life and also reach a generally negative verdict on interest in annuities. Under the parameterizations outlined in that
study, income annuities are avoided by consumers with wealth levels that
would be seriously depleted were a medical shock to occur. This is because
they see annuities as a ‘risky asset,’ since health shocks simultaneously raise
expenses and reduce the value of future annuity payments.
Prior research by Brown and Finkelstein (2004) examines the link
between health considerations and demand for annuities, taking as its
starting point the crucial role that actual and potential LTC expenses play
for retirees. In the USA, the government pays for some long-term care costs
under both the Medicare and Medicaid programs. The former does not
cover all LTC costs, while the latter is the provider of last resort, being
means tested. Currently, over 60 percent of LTC expenses are absorbed by
Medicaid as provider of last resort, yet those with high wealth must absorb
substantial long-term care expenses because of the means testing format.
As a result, more than one-third of LTC expenditures are paid for out of
pocket, nearly double the proportion of expenditures in the health sector
as a whole covered out of pocket (National Center for Health Statistics
2002; Congressional Budget Office 2004).
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The motivation to save for precautionary reasons depends critically on
how consumers weigh Medicaid as a substitute for private LTC. If it is
perceived as a good substitute, households with a low bequest motive will
maintain high old-age consumption levels, and rely on Medicaid to pick up
the tab should they need care in later life. Pauly (1990) argues that this is an
important behavioral pattern in his explanation of why the long-term care
insurance market has failed to thrive in the USA. Yet many people argue the
opposite—indeed the implicit assumption of Sinclair and Smetters (2004)
and Turra and Mitchell (2008) is that Medicaid is actually a very poor
substitute for private care. A lack of evidence on this subject motivates our
research reported in the next section.

Theoretical Model
Our model posits that the older household consists of a single individual
who has just retired at age 65 (following Ameriks et al. 2007) and assumes
that the maximum length of his retirement period is 35 years (to age 100).
His stochastic mortality probability evolves over the retirement period in
the manner defined below. The individual is assumed to maximize his
remaining lifetime utility based on the excess of each period’s consumption
C over a subsistence level, C SUB (see the Technical Appendix for more
model details).3 The consumer also receives an end-of-life utility from a
bequest which is comprised of all assets held at death. The parameter 
indicates how strongly the retiree values bequests (and if wealth is negative
at death, the bequest is zero). Here, bequests are left solely because of the
satisfaction the retiree derives from leaving assets behind. In particular, our
formulation eliminates any motives related to a desire to use the prospect
of a bequest at death to influence the behavior of others while alive. It
should also be noted that our bequest motive is difficult to distinguish from
other explanations for saving (see Carroll 2007) such as hoarding, or simply
‘wealth in the utility function.’4
With respect to functional form, we follow De Nardi (2004) in parameterizing the bequest utility with two parameters, one ( ) reflecting the
strength of the bequest motive, and the other (ϕ) measuring the degree to
which bequests are a luxury good (see the Appendix). To simply illustrate
how these parameters work, consider a case where the retiree starts with
wealth of X dollars, lives for exactly n years, and then dies. In each year of
life, the individual would consume c dollars and, upon death, bequeaths
the remaining b = X−nc. In this simple case, the problem is to choose a
bequest that maximizes total (nondiscounted) utility. Given our functional
forms for utility, the individual will optimally leave an inheritance to cover
 years of spending at an annual expenditure level, the amount by which
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lifetime consumption exceeds the threshold ϕ. If X proves insufficient to
allow the individual to consume such an amount each year, no bequest is
left.
More generally, the retiree starts with some nonnegative wealth amount
and anticipates a constant stream of real annual ‘Social Security’ income
each year Y for as long as he lives.5 There is posited to be one risk-free
asset in which the individual can invest and which yields a constant real
rate of interest (the household is not allowed to borrow against future
income). The individual may be in one of four health states in our model:
state 1 is good health, in state 2 he has medical problems but no need
for long-term care, in state 3 long-term care of some form is required,
and state 4 is death. The individual is initially endowed with a health state,
and thereafter his health state follows a Markov chain with an age-varying,
one-period state transition matrix. A retiree reaching age 99 dies with
probability one the following year. Together, the initial health state and
the Markov transition matrices enable us to compute future probabilities
attached to all health states, including death. Rather than include the
retiree’s health state directly in his utility function, we instead focus on
the costs associated with alternative health states. Each state has associated with it a necessary and deterministic health cost. Paying these costs
removes any utility penalty that would otherwise be associated with the
health state.
In view of the fact that medical expenses might exceed available wealth,
we need to include the possibility of bankruptcy in our model. Accordingly,
an individual is forced to declare bankruptcy when he cannot afford to
pay for medical costs and the subsistence level of consumption. Therefore, his consumption and end-of-period wealth in a period of bankruptcy
depends on his medical state. In states 1 and 2, an individual who declares
bankruptcy is left with sufficient assets to consume at a minimum level
C BAN > C SUB , with end-of-period wealth remaining at zero. In the longterm care state, treatment of bankruptcy is related to the institutional
reality of Medicaid. An individual declaring bankruptcy in the long-term
care state forfeits all wealth to the government (end-of-period wealth is
zero) and enters a Medicaid facility, receiving in that period the Medicaid
level of consumption C MED > C SUB . In the period following bankruptcy,
the individual’s income continues on its deterministic path and there are
no further implications of having been previously bankrupt. The Medicaid
level of consumption, C MED , has a powerful impact on the strength of the
precautionary motive. If C MED is very close to subsistence, there is a strong
incentive for households to retain sufficient wealth to retain the private
care option. If it is closer to annual consumption in the pre-Medicaid
period, then the incentive will be to run down wealth and use the Medicaid
subsidy in place of saving.
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Model Parameterization
An important goal of our analysis is to illustrate how demand for various
financial products varies, as a function of the strength of the precautionary
motive and the bequest motive,  . To this end, we fix all other preference
parameters at conventional, calibrated values, with wealth and income
numbers derived from survey evidence (c.f. Ameriks et al. 2007 and the
Appendix).
With these values and the health and longevity dynamics described
above, the model generates a median value for lifetime medical expenses of
$18,000 for men ($56,000 for women), with a mean of $79,000 ($137,000).
Importantly, long-term care costs make up 92 percent of all medical
expenses. For the 61 percent of males who never enter long-term care,
mean lifetime medical costs are only $7,900. Men (women) face a 26 percent (41 percent) chance of facing lifetime medical costs greater than
$100,000 and a 10 percent (20 percent) chance of costs greater than
$250,000.

Bequest and Medicaid Aversion Parameters
To parameterize retirees’ bequest and Medicaid aversion coefficients, we
draw from a survey designed to separately identify these two within a
narrow range (Ameriks et al. 2007). In what follows, we provide both
point estimates of median values and confidence bands. The median level
of Medicaid aversion was around −5 (corresponding to a consumption
equivalent of Medicaid of ∼$10,000) while our best estimate of the population median level of the bequest motive was roughly 26. Yet there is
substantial heterogeneity in our estimates: over one-quarter of respondents said they felt Medicaid to be so undesirable that it barely exceeded
subsistence income of $5,000 (by less than $1,000). Over half of the
respondents valued the consumption equivalent of Medicaid at below
$10,000. On the other hand, some 30 percent of respondents display
little or no such Medicaid aversion, treating a year in a Medicaid facility
as equivalent to an annual consumption flow of $20,000 or more. This
heterogeneity must be borne in mind when interpreting the figures that
follow.
Turning to survey evidence on bequest motives, we again find substantial
heterogeneity. More than one-quarter of the sample had strong bequest
desires ( > 40), with a very strong bequest preference ( > 90) estimated for some 10 percent of the sample. Accordingly, based on our survey
questions, it would appear that many individuals do place a high priority on
bequests. We also show that wealth is not significantly related to estimated
bequest parameters.
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Implications for the Demand for Standard
Life Annuities
Given this model setup, we next calculate the value of lifetime annuities
for various different types of retirees. Our model predicts that the demand
for annuities is positively associated with wealth, similar to that reported
by Sinclair and Smetters (2004). For a given level of wealth and income,
demand for annuities also varies according to the retiree’s bequest and
precautionary parameters. To quantify these effects, we develop and graph
iso-valuation lines that indicate the amount per dollar of actuarially fair
value that an individual would be willing to pay to purchase a given insurance contract. The excess of the indicated value above 1 can be interpreted
as the maximum ‘load’ that an individual would be willing to pay for
the given contract. For example, an iso-valuation of 1.20 means that the
individual with the indicated combination of bequest and precautionary
motives at that point on the graph would pay at most a 20 percent load
to obtain the contract. These calculations are conditional on given wealth
and income levels, chosen to represent a hypothetical, ‘typical’ participant
in an employer-sponsored pension plan.
To construct the baseline case, we assume the following ‘median’ respondent: female, age 65, in good health, having disposable (real) lifetime
income of $15,000 per year, and initial wealth of $200,000. Figure 11-1
shows how much this baseline respondent would be willing to pay for a
$5,000 annual annuity stream (actuarially equivalent to a present value of
$86,000 under our parameterization). The horizontal ‘Bequest Motive’ axis
of Figure 11-1 (and all subsequent figures) is straightforward to interpret.
The vertical ‘Medicaid aversion’ axis plots the log of the marginal utility of
C MED , a function of C MED that describes the strength of the precautionary
motive, so that the precautionary savings motive strengthens from bottom
to top. Note that a Medicaid aversion value of zero on this axis corresponds
to a low value for C MED of $6,000, or only $1,000 above the subsistence level;
a value of −5 indicates a value for C MED of just over $10,000; and a value
of −10 indicates a value for CMED of some $30,000. The bottom left corner
of Figure 11-1 depicts a retiree with no bequest motive and essentially no
aversion to Medicaid. As expected, such an individual has a strong desire
for annuities; her willingness to pay for this annuity is 2.2, meaning that
the product would be demanded even for a 120 percent load. However,
this willingness drops quickly as the strength of either motive increases.
At typical values of the bequest motive and Medicaid aversion, the retiree
would only purchase the annuity if it were priced at a load of less than
10 percent. At higher levels of Medicaid aversion, the annuity remains
attractive only if priced at a load of less than 3 percent. Accordingly, for
many retirees, a standard annuity is of minimal value given with typical
loads of 7–15 percent.
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Bequest motive

Figure 11-1. Baseline estimates of willingness to pay for a $5,000 fixed annuity by
level of Medicaid aversion and strength of bequest motive. Source: Authors’ calculations. Notes: The contour lines in this figure represent various levels of the ratio
of the retiree’s estimated willingness to pay to the zero-cost, risk-neutral present
valuation of the annuity contract. For example, for all combinations of Medicaid
aversion and bequest motives on the line marked ‘1.2’ in the figure above, the
retiree is willing to pay (up to) 20 percent above the cost of the contract in order to
obtain the contract. For this figure, the retiree is assumed to be a healthy, 65-yearold female, with $200,000 in total wealth and preexisting (real) annuity income
of $15,000 per year. Estimates of the median values of the strength of the bequest
motive and Medicaid aversion within the surveyed population are indicated by the
grey dashed lines on the chart.

Figure 11-2 presents the same analysis for a larger annuity: $10,000
annually instead of $5,000. The results are similar to Figure 11-1, though
everywhere the retiree is less willing to pay per dollar of cost. The reason such a retiree is willing to pay less per dollar is straightforward:
while the annuity payments are higher, the cost of the annuity is also
twice as high ($172,000 compared to $86,000 for the $5,000 annuity in
our parameterization), requiring the annuitant to relinquish even more
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Figure 11-2. Baseline estimates of willingness to pay for a $10,000 fixed annuity
by level of Medicaid aversion and strength of bequest motive. Source: Authors’
calculations. Note: See Figure 11-1.

liquid wealth. This leaves her much more exposed to the risk that an LTC
shock will force bankruptcy and/or seriously deplete assets remaining for a
bequest.
Figure 11-3 presents the willingness-to-pay results for the smaller $5,000
annuity again, but now we assume that the retiree has less annual income
and more liquid wealth. This reinforces the intuition just given above:
with greater wealth, the risk subsides of bankruptcy due to LTC costs or
depletion of the intended bequest, making the individual more willing
to pay for the annuity. Relative to Figure 11-1, the wealthier retiree of
Figure 11-3 is slightly more willing to pay for the annuity at virtually all
combinations of Medicaid aversion and bequest motive.
Figure 11-4 presents the analysis for a retiree with both less income
(here only $10,000 annually) and less wealth than in our baseline case
($100,000 vs $200,000 previously). At all levels of bequest motive and Medicaid aversion, this retiree is significantly less willing to pay for the $5,000
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Figure 11-3. Higher liquid wealth estimates of willingness to pay for a $5,000
fixed annuity by level of Medicaid aversion and strength of bequest motive.
Source: Authors’ calculations. Notes: See Figure 11-1. For this figure, the retiree
is assumed to be a healthy, 65-year-old female, with $286,000 in total wealth
and preexisting (real) annuity income of $10,000 per year. Estimates of the
median values of the strength of the bequest motive and Medicaid aversion
within the surveyed population are indicated by the grey dashed lines on the
chart.

annuity. Contrary to arguments on the demand or ‘need’ for annuities,
our analysis suggests that as wealth decreases, demand decreases as well, as
annuitization exposes the less wealthy retirees to a greater risk of ending
up on Medicaid or sacrificing their bequests.
Figure 11-5 shows that the shape of the iso-value curves is very different
for those with high wealth. This figure is for a woman at age 65, in good
health, with disposable income of $25,000 and total wealth of $500,000,
who roughly corresponds to the 90th percentile of empirical income- and
wealth-distributions. Given these parameters, willingness to pay for annuities for the wealthy increases as Medicaid aversion increases, especially
among those with strong bequest motives.
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Figure 11-4. Lower-wealth and -income estimates of willingness to pay for a $5,000
fixed annuity by level of Medicaid aversion and strength of bequest motive.
Source: Authors’ calculations. Note: See Figure 11-3.

We also explore the effect of risk aversion over bequests by changing the
standard formulation of the bequest motive to one in which the retiree
cares only about the expected value of the bequest and disregards the
odds of the ultimate bequest being higher or lower than expected (being
‘risk neutral’). This specification of the bequest motive produces results
similar to Figure 11-5, leading us to conclude that our overall analysis is not
generally sensitive to whether retirees are described as risk averse or risk
neutral over the size of their bequests.
We conclude that the strength of the bequest and precautionary motives
are important determinants of interest in annuities. For a retiree who
has no bequest motive and regards Medicaid as a good substitute for
private LTC, annuities are a valuable form of insurance against longevity.
However, as the desire to leave a bequest and avoid government-financed
LTC increases, holding liquid assets becomes more important and interest
in annuities wanes. This conclusion naturally suggests that we consider
alternatives to standard life annuities.
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Figure 11-5. Higher-wealth and -income estimates of willingness to pay for a
$5,000 fixed annuity by level of Medicaid aversion and strength of bequest motive.
Source: Authors’ calculations. Note: See Figure 11–1. For this figure, the retiree is
assumed to be a healthy, 65-year-old female, with $500,000 in total wealth and
preexisting (real) annuity income of $25,000 per year. Estimates of the median
values of the strength of the bequest motive and Medicaid aversion within the
surveyed population are indicated by the grey dashed lines on the chart.

Implications for Alternative Annuity Structures
Next, we outline and evaluate three annuity structures that would appear
to be better targeted to the retirees we model. The first is areversible annuity,
which allows the holder to exchange the future income flow for its current
cash value upon entering the LTC state. This is a straightforward response
to the concern that purchasing the annuity depletes one’s liquid wealth,
which is particularly valuable when the retiree faces the high cost of LTC.
The second is a longevity insurance contract, in which an individual makes
up-front, irreversible payments in exchange for a promise that an insurer
will pay an annual income for life beginning only if and when the annuitant
reaches a prespecified, advanced age. While such a product addresses some
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of the issues that would seem to limit interest in conventional annuities,
we believe it is of limited relevance in the context of our model. What
is needed to significantly impact market interest in our framework is the
introduction either of long-term care insurance features or some form of
life-insurance features. Because life-insurance contracts and life annuities
are offsetting financial contracts, most interesting for us are arrangements
involving explicit tie-ins with LTCI. The third contract we examine is of
this form, combining a standard life annuity with extra payments in the LTC
state.
Intriguingly, these three are not products currently attracting the interest
of households and financial designers. At the end of this section we outline
actual developments in annuity markets. Why these changes are taking
place and how they differ from the next steps that follow from application
of richer life-cycle models is a crucial research subject, as outlined in the
final section.

Reversible Annuity
The value of flexibility in terms of liquidity is demonstrated in Figure 11-6,
which shows the willingness to pay for a reversible annuity of $5,000 annually.
Reversibility here simply means that the annuitant could obtain the present
value of any remaining annuity payments (adjusted for current age, mortality, and health status) when she needs LTC. This type of reversibility is
not generally a feature of real-world annuity contracts; however, we show
that if such a feature could be offered at relatively low additional cost,
demand for annuities would increase quite substantially, especially among
those with strong Medicaid aversion. Compared to the standard annuity,
the reversibility option increases the willingness pay by up to 16 percent for
the most Medicaid averse retiree depicted. For those with a strong bequest
motive, the reversibility feature adds little to the value of the annuity (which
is sensible; being able to reverse the annuity has no value at death, which is
the state of greatest relevance to those with high bequest motives).

Longevity Insurance
While this product is sometimes deemed an innovation, it is effectively a
highly restrictive contingent deferred annuity with a zero surrender/cash
value and a constraint on when annuity income payments may begin. Nevertheless, it could potentially be structured such that the premium payments
required are individually small and occur over a number of years, rather
than as a single lump sum. In a world in which uninsurable, health-related
expense shocks can occur and borrowing is costly or impossible, the ability
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Figure 11-6. Baseline estimates of willingness to pay for a reversible $5,000
fixed annuity by level of Medicaid aversion and strength of bequest motive.
Source: Authors’ calculations. Notes: See Figure 11-1. For this figure, the retiree is
assumed to be a healthy, 65-year-old female, with $200,000 in total wealth and preexisting (real) annuity income of $15,000 per year. Estimates of the median values
of the strength of the bequest motive and Medicaid aversion within the surveyed
population are indicated by the grey dashed lines on the chart. The annuity used in
this figure is different from those used in Figures 11-1 through 11-5, as this annuity
can be ‘reversed’ (in other words, cashed-in or refunded) at any time.

to spread the cost of the annuity out over many periods’ future periods may
be of some value.
We model this product as a sequence of equal mortality-contingent payments that must be made in order to obtain income benefit beginning
at a later date. The contract has no cashable value, but simply provides
an annuity benefit late in life at little up-front cost at the point of retirement. Figure 11-7 illustrates our baseline retiree’s willingness to pay for
such a contract. Specifically, we consider a policy that pays annual benefits
of $10,000 starting at age 85 in exchange for constant annual payments
from the current age of 65 through age 84. Under our parameterization,
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Figure 11-7. Baseline estimates of willingness to pay for $10,000 ‘longevity insurance’ annuity by level of Medicaid aversion and strength of bequest motive.
Source: Authors’ calculations. Notes: See Figure 11-1. For this figure, the retiree
is assumed to be a healthy, 65-year-old female, with $200,000 in total wealth and
preexisting (real) annuity income of $15,000 per year. Estimates of the median
values of the strength of the bequest motive and Medicaid aversion within the
surveyed population are indicated by the grey dashed lines on the chart. The
annuity used in this figure is different from those used in Figures 11-1 through 116. This annuity is a ‘longevity insurance’ policy that pays annual benefits of $10,000
starting at age 85 in exchange for level, constant annual payments from the current
age of 65 through age 84.

actuarially fair payments for this contract are $1,560 per year. Relative to
Figure 11-2 (the standard $10,000 annuity for the same retiree), we see
that this contract structure modestly enhances willingness to pay for those
with strong bequest motives and for those with Medicaid aversion in the
middle of the range graphed. For those with low levels of both Medicaid
aversion and bequest motive, there is actually less willingness to pay for
the product, probably because it ultimately provides less protection against
pure longevity risk than the standard annuity.
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Combining Annuities with LTC Insurance
Au: Murtaugh,
C. M. (2002) and
(2003) is not
listed in the
reference list.
Either include
these in the list
or delete the
citations.

An LTC/life-annuity combination was discussed by Pauly (1990), and more
recently by Murtaugh, Spillman, and Warshawsky (2001, 2002, 2003). Here
the idea is a straightforward combination of a life annuity with a disability
type ‘pop-up’ benefit triggered by LTC needs. The specific product proposed by Murtaugh, Spillman, and Warshawsky (2001) combines a lifetime
immediate annuity of $1,000 (nominal) per month, with a ‘pop-up’ payment of an additional $2,000 monthly for annuitants with 2 ADL (Activity of
Daily Living or severe cognitive) impairments, plus another $1,000 monthly
if the annuitant had 4 ADL impairments. Those authors argue that this
combination product could alleviate adverse selection/pricing problems
in both the LTC and annuity markets, and they estimate the cost of such
a combination policy at about 3 percent less than if the two products were
purchased separately.
The mechanics of such a policy are straightforward. Assuming actuarial
fairness and complete information, suppose that a LTC policy which would
pay X dollars per month in the LTC state costs Y dollars per month.
Assume also a standard immediate life-annuity paying A dollars per month
costs B dollars under the same assumptions. Purchasing the ‘combination’ policy then consists of paying B dollars to obtain a life annuity,
and using Y dollars of the annuity payments to obtain LTC benefits X.
Hence the ‘combination product’ pays a monthly benefit of (A − Y ) in
non-LTC, non-death states, and (A + X) dollars in the LTC state (assuming
premiums cease once the individual claims LTC benefits), and nothing at
death.
Figure 11-8 shows demand for the hypothetical LTC/annuity policy that
pays a standard $5,000 annual annuity and an additional $10,000 per year
of long-term care. The fair cost of this policy is $102,700, of which $86,300
is used to cover the annuity component and the remaining $16,400 covers
LTC benefits. The figure illustrates that consumer demand for such a
product would be expected to be strong and rise with Medicaid aversion,
primarily due to the LTC component of the policy. For a retiree with no
bequest motive or Medicaid aversion, LTC insurance is undesirable because
it consumes resources and delivers benefits in states that are not of great
concern. For all other parameter values, our calculations predict that there
should be a tremendous demand for LTC insurance, even if offered at very
high loads. For the most Medicaid averse, our model predicts that individuals would purchase the LTC component at loads of up to 300 percent!
For those who dislike Medicaid or fear the depletion of their bequest, the
LTC element offers insurance against the risk that most strongly threatens
their security and so is the most appealing product. The reason these
tremendous demands do not appear in the willingness to pay for the hybrid
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Figure 11-8. Baseline Estimates of willingness to pay for a ‘pop-up’ LTCI/annuity
combination by level of Medicaid aversion and strength of bequest motive.
Source: Authors’ calculations. Notes: See Figure 11-1. For this figure, the retiree
is assumed to be a healthy, 65-year-old female, with $200,000 in total wealth and
preexisting (real) annuity income of $15,000 per year. Estimates of the median
values of the strength of the bequest motive and Medicaid aversion within the
surveyed population are indicated by the grey dashed lines on the chart. The
annuity used in this figure is different from those used in Figures 11-1 through
11-6. This annuity is a hypothetical LTCI/annuity policy that pays a standard $5,000
annual annuity and an additional $10,000 in each year of LTC.

product is the annuity component, which consumes most of the premium
and remains relatively undesirable as described above. When compared to
their willingness to purchase the annuity and LTC components separately,
we find that people would be willing to pay only 96–99 percent of the
combined value for the hybrid product. Our interpretation for this finding
is that the two forms of insurance complement each other, so the combination suffers from simple decreasing returns to scale. In other words, having
purchased the annuity component, the LTC element becomes slightly less
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valuable and vice versa. Nevertheless, the clear conclusion of this exercise
is that any attempt to market a credible LTC insurance product, either
alone or coupled with an annuity, should receive great interest among
retirees.

Innovations in Annuity Design
Many suggestions about annuity and LTC combination products have been
circulating among academics and policymakers, and several commercial
firms have offered annuities with LTC riders. To date, these contracts offer
LTC coverage paid for by periodic withdrawals from cash surrender values
from an associated deferred annuity contract. Because deferred annuity
contracts retain significant cash value, we posit that this type of product
does not provide the ideal combination of longevity insurance and LTC
protection; one product is described by Milliman Consultants (2004). It
is possible that the commercial success of such policies may have been
hampered by a variety of practical issues. For example, until recently, annuity owners were unable to convert preexisting accumulations on deferred
annuity contracts to a combination type product that offers an insurance
rider without triggering a taxable event.
Of course, it may be that policies with particular designs, for instance
those involving large up-front costs/premiums, are avoided for other psychological reasons. And much product innovation in the annuity area
seems to have psychological as much as economic origins. There is increasing awareness on the part of financial service providers concerning the
perceived limitations of stand-alone annuities. The basic problem appears
to be consumer discomfort with relinquishing large lump sums in exchange
for future promises to pay. Given such discomfort, many if not most
immediate annuity products are now sold with ‘refund features’ or other
options that effectively amount to the addition of a saving/investment
vehicle to the insurance product. For example, between two-thirds and
three-quarters of the immediate life annuities purchased by retiring TIAACREF participants included of some form of ‘refund’ feature at the time
of purchase, guaranteeing at least a minimum number of future payments
in all states, regardless of realized longevity (Ameriks 2002). Of course, for
insurance to be effectively provided (and for insurers to remain solvent in
an equilibrium), resources must be relinquished by the insured in some
states or contingencies, so that they can be transferred in some way to
provide benefits in other states/contingencies. If consumers are unwilling
to ‘pay premiums’ in states where risks do not materialize, there is no scope
to provide benefits above those that could be achieved absent insurance in
states where risks do materialize.
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In recent years, so-called ‘living benefits’ riders have become popular in
many deferred annuity contracts. For example, some 70 percent of new
deferred annuity contracts are issued with riders that provide ‘guaranteed
minimum withdrawal’ benefits, where a certain minimum level of income
is promised in each year for a specified term (or for life), while the contract
holder retains the ability to access a lump-sum/cash value at any time
during that term. The lifetime versions of such products amount to the
remittance of small periodic insurance premiums in exchange for the
purchase of contingent lifetime annuity payments received only in states
of world in which resources have been exhausted according to a minimum
payment schedule and the annuitant is alive. The vast bulk of premiums
paid for such contracts are represented by the value of the investments
held on the contract; the embedded annuity amounts to a small fraction
of the contract’s initial value. These contracts apparently have wide appeal,
but they can be quite complicated to analyze and price as illustrated by
Milevsky (2006). It remains unclear why products have developed in this
domain while remaining so limited in others. There are surely legal and
regulatory constraints that make more innovative products costly to bring
to market, especially if the innovative firm that finally breaks through
the regulatory barrier cannot in some way exclude others from quickly
following.

Promising Research Avenues
Next we turn to a brief discussion how research can help in the development of security-enhancing financial instruments for retirees. We do
not discuss issues related to the definition of retirement, such as those
highlighted by Chan and Huff-Stevens (2008) concerning returns to work.
Rather, we focus on areas in which improved understanding and practice
are needed in order for those who are fully retired to face improved
prospects.

LTC and Bequests as Family Matters
Our approach has emphasized the critical importance of LTC costs for
retirement security, and we have suggested that insurance against these
costs would be of great value to retirees. In practice, however, real-world
sales of LTC insurance products are almost as low as sales of immediate annuities, which suggests that current LTC insurance contracts may
be perceived by consumers as failing to provide effective insurance for
retirees. More appealing long-term care products must respond to the
reality that family members today bear the bulk of private long-term
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provision, implying that is vital to understand how families can and do
contribute to long-term care arrangements for elders. Estimates of the
incidence of caregiving within families vary across studies and datasets,
but the National Alliance for Caregiving and AARP (2004) estimate that
44.4 million Americans are caregivers and provide that care in 22.9 million
households in the USA (21 percent of households). The annual value
of the services provided by such caregivers has been estimated at $257
billion (Arno 2002), which, if correct, would dwarf the value of formal LTC
services.
These types of informal care arrangements may be a particularly important manifestation of the various problems that afflict the LTC insurance
market (Consumer Reports 2003; Duhigg 2007). Among the most important defects of existing LTC policies is that typical LTC contracts are built
on a standard reimbursement model, in which care expenses are incurred
and submitted either by the policyholder or the care provider directly for
reimbursement. These contracts hence involve some degree of risk that
the insurer may deem some expenses/claims ineligible for coverage. Given
the dynamic nature of medical science and treatment standards, in such
long-term policies, how can one be assured that technological advances or
the emergence of new or alternative treatments will be covered if needed?
There is even some risk that the insurer will fail, although Lopes and
Michaelides (2007) suggest that this factor alone is insufficient to explain
low use of LTC services. However, if all such contracting problems taken
together are perceived by retirees as significant, the only possible responses
are to conserve resources and to rely in large part on the kindness of others
to assist when the time comes.
In some cases, retaining assets may be in part a strategy that enables
at least some compensation for informal caregivers who may be more
willing to provide care if they do not have to do it ‘for free.’ Norton and
Van Houtven (2005) conclude that parents providing inter vivos wealth
transfers tend to provide those transfers to children who provide them with
care. Clearly, one interpretation is that the transfers are informal, at least
partial, payment for care services rendered; the older parent’s transfer of
wealth while alive may give care recipients some degree of control over how
resources are spent.
If it is true that informal care arrangements are, in fact, how most of
the infirm elderly receive care, it suggests that insurance arrangements
better suited to supporting this existing infrastructure would be valuable.
Research is needed to better understand how family structure feeds into
the care-bequest complex, as this is a vital ingredient not only in financial
innovation but also in public policy, where allowing for transfers to family
members in exchange for care offers the potential to reduce the burden
on the public purse.
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The Role of Housing Wealth
Retirees must make many important portfolio decisions, some of which
pertain to the general level of risk they bear; annuity products can have
an important incentive effect in this regard (Milevsky and Kyrychenko
2008). Another issue pertains to the use of one’s home to finance longterm care. Many retired households hold the majority of their wealth in
the form of housing, and there is debate on the extent to which this should
be treated as available for consumption in case of medical emergencies.
In a recent study, Walker (2004) uses three waves of the Association for
Higher Education Access and Disability (AHEAD) data (1995, 1998, and
2000) to sharpen understanding of the circumstances under which housing
equity is released by the elderly. She confirms that there are large declines
in ownership rates for both married and single households late in the life
cycle. For example, for married households with a younger spouse aged
80–81 at baseline, the rate of homeownership fell by 23 percentage points
between 1995 and 2000. Particularly large declines were associated with
demographic and health states such as ill health, nursing home stays lasting
over 100 days, and death. These patterns suggest that there may be an
intimate connection between the possible need for care and the need the
elderly feel to own their homes ‘free and clear.’

Psychological Factors
Psychological factors play an important role in retirement, with one of the
most significant relating to decision-making competence. For instance, as
noted above, one way to deliver resources for LTC care involves cash payments to qualified beneficiaries; this is appealing to many as it eliminates
having to deal with insurers. On the other hand, beneficiaries can also be
exploited by those who take over their decision-making authority (Stone
2001). (It is not clear that fears of abuse would be different in a reimbursement framework.) Some policymakers and consumer advocates worry that
cash benefits provided to those with a condition requiring LTC services may
not ultimately end up being used to obtain care, if unscrupulous service
providers or even ill-intentioned relatives abuse the structure. Of course,
this neglects the other side of the coin, which is the disregard of personal
preference and limitation of individual choices.

Conclusions
Retirement security, and indeed financial security more generally, can be
summed up simply as ‘having the resources you need, when you need
them.’ Standard immediate life annuities are effective at providing a part

Au: Please check
the expanded
form of
‘AHEAD’.

978–0–19–954910–8

11-Ameriks-c11

OUP239-Ameriks

(Typeset by SPI, Delhi)

272 of 275

February 29, 2008

272 John Ameriks et al.

of the resources needed in retirement, as they can help meet routine
expenditures as long as the retiree is alive and healthy. But such products
do little to deal with retirees’ need for resources when emergencies arise,
and they can even exacerbate financial distress in exigent situations. We
have argued that better retirement security requires new mechanisms
to enable retirees to bring additional resources to bear in emergencies,
particularly given health shocks. Given the potential for a decline in the
ability to make a choice among those who need LTC at the time they need
it, the real design challenge is how to write effective contracts that work
today to anticipate potential future decline, with sufficient safeguards and
flexibility for change at later date. Clearly much research is required in this
important area.
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Appendix
This appendix describes some technical details of our model. The interested reader should also consult Ameriks et al. (2007).
1. Preferences over consumption are described by a standard exponentially discounted, time-separable utility function with constant relative
risk aversion based on the excess of consumption C over a subsistence
level, C SUB : u(C ) = (C − C SUB )1−„ /(1 − „). We set C SUB = 5 (equivalent to $5,000, as we measure dollar amounts in thousands) and „ = 3,
and set the subjective time discount factor to 0.98.
2. End-of-life utility from bequests defined by the function v(b):
v(b) = ( /(1 − „))((ϕ − C SUB ) + (b/ ))1−„ . We use the same
coefficient of CRRA, „ = 3, over bequests as over consumption. We
set ϕ = 12. [Note that Ameriks et al.(2007) use ϕ = 6 so that the
values of  here are analogous but not identical to those reported
in that chapter.]
3. For consumption in non-LTC bankruptcy, we set C BAN = 8. We assume
all saved assets grow at a constant real rate of 2 percent per year, and
we do not allow individuals to borrow (Ameriks et al. 2007 include a
risky asset).
4. The age-dependent transition matrix for health states is calibrated to
national data via 16 parameters (we do this exercise once for men
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and once for women). The state of good health has no costs, the
‘sick’ state (sickness that does not require long-term care) has cost
of $6,000 annually, long-term care costs are set to $50,000 annually,
and we assume zero costs associated with death.

Notes
1

Related work includes studies by Murtaugh, Spillman, and Warshawsky (2001);
Warshawsky, Spillman, and Murtaugh (2002); and Spillman, Murtaugh, and
Warshawsky (2003).
2
The standard references are Yaari (1965) and Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond
(2005).
3
All cash flows are assumed to be in real, inflation-adjusted dollars; we do not
model inflation risk.
4
This approach is similar to the ‘warm glow’ specification of Andreoni (1989) with
a CES parameter matching that for consumption rather than the dynastic altruistic Au: Please
provide the
formulation implied by concern with children’s utility per se.
expanded form
5
Taxes are ignored and we assume no income in the year of death.
of ‘CES’.
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